For many of us in Southeast Asia, the conflict in Myanmar seems far away. There has been limited spillover from the fighting into other parts of the region except for the immediate border areas in Thailand. Neither has there been a flood of refugees and so far, foreign investors have not been scared away from the rest of the region because of the turmoil in Myanmar.
Yet, intense fighting since October could bring the conflict closer to the rest of us. A prolonged stalemate could leave Myanmar as an increasingly dysfunctional state. Insurgents from ethnic minorities could soon be running their little states in the border regions.
The junta will probably retain control of the main cities in the Myanmar heartland where the majority Bamar ethnic group resides, but even that control will be tenuous. Junta leaders will face internal discord and senior leaders may be ousted.
As Myanmar is a country where the interests of China, India and Thailand intersect, there is a growing chance of intervention by one or more of these countries in Myanmar.
What has changed recently?
First, the Myanmar military, which is known as the Tatmadaw, has lost the military initiative.
Against all expectations, the insurgents have made substantial gains, putting General Min Aung Hlain’s military regime on the defensive three years after he ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s government. The insurgent groups had appeared too small, disunited and lacking external support to threaten the military’s grip on the country.
See also: test generate auto url 2
Yet, the junta’s deep unpopularity, even among the majority Bamar community, its poor management of military and economic issues, and wavering support from China paved the way for insurgent gains.
The insurgents have also cooperated more effectively than expected and have been resourceful in overcoming their limitations. There is a good chance of even more setbacks for the military regime soon.
In the Shan state bordering on China, the Three Brotherhood Alliance now controls the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ), including the lucrative trade routes there. The Tatmadaw was forced out of around 17 towns in this region and was humiliated when 2,000 junta soldiers and six brigadier-generals surrendered.
See also: After a reset, has Asean found its mojo?
Rebel forces have also captured the Palaung SAZ, where the Ta’ang ethnic minority dominates. As with the Kokang region, the rebels can now generate revenues by controlling the border trade routes into China.
In the country’s west, the Arakan Army broke its ceasefire with the Tatmadaw and inflicted several defeats on the military, including taking over an important junta military base in the Paletwa region.
In the past few weeks, insurgent attacks have spread elsewhere, including in the Mandalay and Sagaing Regions. But it has not been plain sailing for the rebels. An offensive by the Karenni ethnic group has stalled at Loikaw, the capital of Kayah state. In the southeast of the country, the Karen National Union working together with the People’s Defence Forces allied with the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), has failed to capture important towns, although they did succeed in cutting off the main trade route into Thailand from that part of Myanmar.
Second, there is growing disarray in the heart of the military junta. The fact that thousands of junta troops chose to surrender rather than continue fighting reflects a diminished will to fight — as also shown by the high rate of desertions.
Rebel forces have been able to seize heavy equipment, including armoured vehicles and artillery pieces, from the regime’s forces. Morale would have been further hurt by the sentencing of three senior generals to death for surrendering too hastily, with three others given life imprisonment.
Nobody likes a loser, particularly in a military junta which rules by might. The embarrassing defeats have sparked calls for leadership change, with some prominent regime supporters openly defying General Min Aung Hlain.
An influential ultranationalist monk has called for the general to cede military leadership to his deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win, and focus on his political role. YouTube personalities and editors of the regime’s mouthpieces have criticised the junta leadership.
Sink your teeth into in-depth insights from our contributors, and dive into financial and economic trends
For now, though, the general, having placed loyalists in key positions, is unlikely to face ouster. Still, his position would become untenable if severe reverses, such as towns in the Bamar heartland, fell to the rebels.
Keeping the junta at a distance
The junta does not appear to have a strategy to recover from these setbacks. The junta has scored some own goals with self-defeating tactics. Its brutal use of airpower on rebel-controlled towns has led to a high level of civilian casualties, which would have further alienated an already truculent populace. Its economic management has also been weak, with the economy in poor shape and high prices raising the cost of living.
The taxes on remittances imposed by the government on foreign workers would have made the junta even more unpopular. The regime has also been criticised for its rigid and uncompromising approach in ceasefire talks that the Chinese brokered, resulting in official ceasefires that were quickly broken.
China will be the key actor in Myanmar. Although unhappy with the ouster of Aung San Suu Kyi, Beijing had gone along with Gen Min Aung Hlain’s regime, in line with its policy of working with whichever government is in charge of a country.
Even so, China’s attitude toward the regime changed when the junta tolerated the activities of scam networks operating in northern Myanmar and targeting victims in China. The junta’s slowness in acceding to Chinese requests for action against these criminal networks further alienated China.
China soon made its displeasure clear. Some analysts suspect that the insurgents in the Kokang SAZ only pulled off their military victories because Beijing had approved their offensive.
Not surprisingly, junta figures have castigated China for its role while pro-junta protestors appeared outside the Chinese Embassy to express their anger at China. But, knowing that it cannot alienate China, the military regime has bent to China’s demands and belatedly shut down the criminal syndicates that had offended the Chinese side.
With this concession in the bag, China helped broker a ceasefire in the Kokang region, leaving the insurgents in control of territories seized from the junta. Beijing’s main concern is protecting its flagship China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
This corridor will eventually serve as an alternative access route to the sea for China in case US forces blockade the Straits of Malacca in a conflict situation. Recent attacks by other insurgent groups that it does not influence close to the port of Kyaukpyu, which is the southern terminal of the Corridor, would have alarmed China.
How will the internal situation unfold?
Although the insurgent forces have made gains, the regime’s opponents cannot deliver a killer blow to the junta. The disparate insurgent groups may have improved their coordination substantially, but they are not operating as a single, united force — and they are unlikely to.
The most effective insurgent groups belong to ethnic minorities who aspire to autonomy from Myanmar, whereas the NUG, which is primarily a Bamar institution, only offers a more limited decentralisation. This represents a fundamental difference that will impede the establishment of a more unified force against the junta.
Moreover, for the insurgency to defeat the junta, it has to advance beyond the border areas and threaten the heartland of Myanmar. But they can only do this with more sophisticated weaponry such as air defence capabilities, armoured vehicles and artillery.
That can come only with external support, which appears unlikely. China, India and Thailand have strong strategic interests in their neighbour but are sticking with the military junta for now — so they will not provide safe zones or training or military equipment to the insurgents. The most likely turn of events is as follows:
Given the low morale within the ranks, the central government will likely lose more townships and military posts in the ethnic-majority areas along the borders with India, Bangladesh, China and Thailand and there will be possible friction in the higher echelons.
The regime still can control the Bamar heartland. However, it is deeply unpopular with the Bamars, so the Tatmadaw struggles to recruit replacements for its losses. Thus, insurgent attacks will weaken the regime’s grip even in the Bamar region.
The ethnic insurgent groups will likely establish little statelets that operate independently of the central government. The NUG does not yet have the authority and resources to persuade the various diverse groups to unify these statelets into a more cohesive rebel-controlled entity.
There is likely to be increasing dissension within the junta. General Min Aung Hlain may have to carry out frequent reshuffles to weed out potentially disloyal rivals. This will distract the leadership and erode its ability to regain the initiative.
The economic situation within Myanmar will turn more difficult, prompting larger numbers of its people to flee abroad, mostly into Thailand and India, but increasing numbers may take boats to head towards Malaysia and Indonesia.
Will there be external involvement?
The only regional organisation with the standing to broker a peace agreement is Asean. But Asean is divided on the subject of Myanmar and so unable to make a real difference. The Five-Point Consensus peace plan that it proposed in April 2021 received scant cooperation from Myanmar’s military junta and has gone nowhere.
Despite that, a divided Asean has not been able to devise a fresh approach. Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos appear inclined to support the junta, while the other member countries have lost their patience.
This means that individual countries with strategic interests in Myanmar — principally China, India and Thailand — will be left to defend those interests on their own. Each will probably step up discreet efforts to secure their positions in Myanmar.
Thailand and India will likely limit their interventions to the border areas since their main concern is preventing fighting spillovers or a large refugee influx into their territories. India will also want to ensure that insurgents from its northeastern territories are not able to find safe havens in a dysfunctional Myanmar state.
China may have to go further since its principal strategic interest is the China-Myanmar corridor projects, which traverse the north-south axis of Myanmar. Beijing will be careful, though, using proxies like the Kokang insurgent groups in the north to do its bidding rather than intervene directly.
It is difficult to envisage a good outcome in Myanmar in the near term. An internal coup within the regime that brings to power leaders more amenable to compromise might result in a negotiated settlement, but that seems unlikely for now. In the meantime, the people of Myanmar will suffer greatly.
As the situation in Myanmar worsens, there will be more concerns of repercussions on its neighbours as well, as they see more refugees and at least occasional spillovers of fighting onto their territories.
Asean’s ineffectiveness in managing a crisis in its backyard will, unfortunately, diminish its credibility with other big powers. The Myanmar crisis leaves no winners, only losers.
Manu Bhaskaran is CEO of Centennial Asia Advisors
